Abstract: Genetic testing for long QT syndrome exemplifies patenting and exclusive licensing with different outcomes at different times. Exclusive licensing from the University of Utah changed the business model from sole provider to two US providers of long QT syndrome testing. Long QT syndrome is associated with mutations in many genes, 12 of which are now tested by two competing firms in the United States, PGxHealth and GeneDx. Until 2009, PGxHealth was the sole provider, based largely on exclusive rights to patents from the University of Utah and elsewhere. University of Utah patents were initially licensed to DNA Sciences, whose patent rights were acquired by Genaissance, and then by Clinical Data, Inc., which owns PGxHealth. In 2002, DNA Sciences, Inc., "cleared the market" by sending cease-and-desist patent enforcement letters to university and reference laboratories offering long QT syndrome genetic testing. There was no test on the market for a 1-to 2-year period. From 2005From -2008, most long QT syndrome-related patents were controlled by Clinical Data, Inc., and its subsidiary PGxHealth. Bio-Reference Laboratories, Inc., secured countervailing exclusive patent rights starting in 2006, also from the University of Utah, and broke the PGxHealth monopoly in early 2009, creating a duopoly for genetic testing in the United States and expanding the number of genes for which commercial testing is available from 5 to 12. Genet Med 2010:12(4):S111-S154.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Familial long QT syndrome (LQTS) affects 1 in 3000 newborns. It is a Mendelian condition in which patients' hearts do not recharge appropriately after heartbeats and can lead to life-threatening arrhythmias. It accounts for a small but significant fraction of sudden death in young people. Beta-blocker drugs and implantable cardioverter defibrillators are the most common therapies. Patients and those close to them can also endeavor to avoid triggers for arrhythmias such as loud noises or physical or emotional stress.
• Mutations in 12 susceptibility genes account for some 75% of familial LQTS; of that 75%, mutations in three genes account for most cases. Genetic testing for LQTS is important because knowing which gene (and which part of that gene) is mutated can have a direct bearing on decisions regarding preventive measures and pharmacological therapies.
• The major LQTS susceptibility genes were discovered at the University of Utah in the mid-1990s. Their discovery was funded in part by the National Institutes of Health. The first LQTS gene patent was awarded in 1997.
• The University of Utah Research Foundation began licensing patents on LQTS susceptibility genes in the late 1990s. Until recently, at any one time, there was never more than a single licensee of the major intellectual property (IP) attached to the three genes that predispose to the majority of familial LQTS. In 2008, Bio-Reference Laboratories (BRLI) obtained an exclusive license for one of those patents and also for two others, giving it rights to test for LQT3, which accounts for ϳ10 -15% of inherited LQTS. BRLI has since aggregated IP related to susceptibility genes for other forms of LQTS. As a consequence, the patent landscape for LQTS testing has become fragmented between 2 different exclusive licensees.
• In 2002, before a commercial test of five genes was launched under the name FAMILION ® , there were at least two other fee-for-service providers of genetic testing; however, they focused their sequencing on regions previously associated with mutations causing LQTS, which amounted to a minority of the five genes' combined coding sequence. Subsequent enforcement of the gene patents prompted at least one diagnostic provider, GeneDx (subsequently acquired by BRLI), to cease testing in 2002. We suggest that, based on incomplete evidence, this probably had a small but tangible negative effect on patient access to genetic testing for LQTS between 2002 and 2004. We believe this negative effect would likely have been larger had there been greater awareness, understanding, and acceptance of genetic testing on the part of cardiologists and electrophysiologists at that time.
• From 2005-2008, most LQTS gene IP relevant to clinical genetic testing was controlled by Clinical Data, Inc., and its subsidiary, PGxHealth LLC. During that period, the company did not sublicense its test to any other diagnostic services in the United States, although it has granted international licenses in Australia, New Zealand, and Europe. It has also granted a research license to a company in Utah.
• In general, clinicians whom we spoke to say that PGxHealth does a very good job of performing genetic testing of the five genes that account for ϳ75% of LQTS. Its turnaround time for a complex, sequence-based test is typically less than 2 months versus what is often a year or more for research-based testing. The company reports that its turnaround time has been substantially reduced since it began offering the test. PGxHealth's FAMILION testing continues to be widely adopted by cardiologists and electrophysiologists, which the company attributes to its efforts to educate physicians and patients, its customer service, and diligent advocacy for reimbursement policies and payment agreement with insurers and health plans. It can be argued that (and has been by PGxHealth parent Clinical Data) an exclusive license has contributed to the company's skill at performing the test and allowed it to leverage economies of scale. GeneDx parent company BRLI attributes these improvements to the march of technology and the threat of competition.
• PGxHealth has been criticized for occasional laboratory errors (missed mutations and misinterpretations). It is not clear that the laboratory's error rate is outside acceptable norms, or worse than its stated analytical accuracy of Ͼ99%. PGxHealth says it implements process changes to ensure that any errors are not repeated, thus leading to improved accuracy over time. Misinterpretation, the company says, can be a subjective phenomenon in a complex disease such as LQTS. PGxHealth consults with experts in the field to review variants of questionable interpretation. It also issues amended reports when interpretations change because of new knowledge in the field.
• PGxHealth performs proficiency testing in conjunction with Michael Ackerman, a researcher and physician at the Mayo Clinic who has the sequencing facilities and diverse genetic samples and clinical profiles necessary to conduct such a program in accordance with the relatively nonspecific regulations set forth by the CLIA, the pertinent federal statute. By all accounts, Dr. Ackerman is an outstanding clinician and researcher who has greatly advanced the cause and treatment of LQTS patients. His financial arrangements with Clinical Data and PGxHealth have been reported to and vetted by Mayo, and his service as a consultant to PGxHealth has been disclosed in publications.
• In 2005, PGxHealth reported allelic dropout in research laboratory screening of LQTS patients. This phenomenon, a technical issue associated with DNA amplification assays, can result in false negatives (i.e., results that report no relevant mutation when in fact a deletion or genomic rearrangement has altered the relevant protein). The company's identification and publication of this problem ultimately increased the sensitivity of LQTS genetic testing.
• The overall yield of FAMILION testing, as reported by PGxHealth in 2007, was 38% vs. 50% for the 1995-2004 era of research-based testing. This lower figure is likely because of an increase in surveillance of borderline cases resulting from the availability of large-scale commercial testing. Another possible factor reducing yield might have been surveillance of fewer genes in the commercial test than in research laboratories prior to 2009. • PGxHealth has been criticized by at least one clinician (Wendy Chung, who consults for competitor BRLI) for its difficulty in processing paraffin-embedded samples from deceased individuals. Routine extraction of DNA from such samples remains a challenge. Based on the anecdotal accounts that we have received from the company, referring physicians, and potential competitors, we have no evidence that PGxHealth is less (or more) adept at performing this procedure than other commercial diagnostic laboratories.
• Until 2009, PGxHealth tested just five genes in its LQTS testing panel, citing both minimal benefit in light of the rarity of mutations in the 7 other genes known to predispose to LQTS and uncertain clinical interpretation of uncharacterized background variants in these genes. When GeneDx secured exclusive rights on LQTS genes and entered the market, PGxHealth also expanded its testing to more than ten genes.
• Patients who were not found to have a mutation in the genes included in the panel were referred to research laboratories for additional testing. Research laboratories, however, may take months or years to return results. Although it is possible that sublicensing of the right to test the major genes would have made other providers more willing to assume the burden of testing the rarer loci, we cannot know this.
• The recent acquisition of selected LQTS gene patent licenses by BRLI may offer a real-world test of how prices respond to competition and of whether testing technology changes with competition, although the nature of the competition may not be head-to-head for the same mutations unless a cross-licensing arrangement is struck between the rival testing services.
• Newer technologies minimize the cost of adding new mutations, but without competition, the commercial incentive to find new platforms is reduced.
• PGxHealth does not offer prenatal genetic diagnosis for LQTS, effectively making it unavailable in the United States prior to 2009. The company does not have an official policy governing prenatal diagnosis. It claims that there are technical difficulties in distinguishing maternal from fetal DNA; however, other clinicians and would-be LQTS genetic test providers argue that this technical issue is trivial. At least one other former competitor has claimed that the company denied its request to offer prenatal testing. Given the treatable nature of LQTS and the highly variable phenotype, it is not clear how strong the demand would be for prenatal or preimplantation testing. We do know that at least one provider offered prenatal diagnosis in 2002 before patent enforcement actions. GeneDx told us that it does not routinely offer prenatal diagnosis for LQTS but would consider it.
• From 2004 -2008, there were three publications in peer reviewed journals that feature PGxHealth scientists as coauthors; most data have been presented at various cardiology meetings. Given the availability of a European mutation database and an international registry containing thousands of LQTS genotypes and phenotypes, PGxHealth's decision not to publish its mutation data prior to 2009 seems unlikely to have harmed patient care. Moreover, PGxHealth does not necessarily have access to the detailed phenotypic data that make mutation catalogs useful. However, one former provider and would-be competitor insisted to us that a knowledge base of certain detailed, clinically useful phenotypic information is likely to come only from high-volume commercial diagnostic laboratories and not from research laboratories. • Conflicts of interest abound in this case study. These conflicts affect not only officers of PGxHealth and its primary consultant physician-scientist but also former, present and would-be providers of LQTS genetic testing.
WHAT IS LONG QT SYNDROME?
Congenital long QT syndrome (LQTS) is an inherited cardiac disorder affecting about 1 in 3000 to 1 in 5000 people. LQTS patients may experience fainting (syncope), seizures, or sudden death, although the phenotype can vary widely. 1 Most of the 1 in 2000 people harboring mutations in LQTS susceptibility genes will remain silent carriers throughout their lives. 2 That is, there are more people who have mutations in relevant genes than people who actually have a clinical syndrome. Nevertheless, the disease appears to explain a small but significant fraction of sudden cardiac deaths in young people. [2] [3] [4] Moreover, some 5% of cases of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) are thought to be attributable to familial or sporadic LQTS. 5 The "QT" in long QT refers to a telltale measurement seen on an electrocardiogram (ECG). The QT interval is the time it takes for the heart to recharge (repolarize) after each beat. Depending on age and gender, when the corrected QT interval (QTc) exceeds ϳ440 -470 milliseconds, it is considered to be prolonged. A prolonged QT interval coupled with a clinical history of fainting and a family history of LQTS or unexplained sudden cardiac death strongly suggest a diagnosis of LQTS. 1 Clinical manifestations of LQTS are the result of the heart "spinning out of control" into a characteristic tachycardia (speeding of the heart rate) called torsades de pointes. Torsades de pointes cause an individual to faint; he or she may then wake up, experience seizures, or die. Survival then depends on whether the heart spontaneously assumes its normal rhythm or an internal or external defibrillator stops the arrhythmia. 6 High-risk patients are typically treated with beta-blocker drugs, which can reduce the risk of life-threatening cardiac events. 1,2,7 Implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICDs) may be used as a primary therapy in patients refractory to betablocker therapy or as a secondary measure in addition to betablockers. 8 -10 Surgical denervation and pacemakers have also been used with some success. 1, 11 Although LQTS with accompanying deafness (Jervell and Lange-Nielsen Syndrome [JLNS] ) and the classical form of the disease (LQT1, Romano-Ward Syndrome) were described more than 40 years ago, the exact molecular basis of the disorder eluded investigators until 1995. 1, 6, [12] [13] [14] It was then that Mark Keating's NIH-funded group at the University of Utah isolated genes predisposing to LQT2 and LQT3. With the cloning of these genes and the isolation of the LQT1 gene the next year, 15 it became clear that defects in cellular sodium and potassium ion channels (or related proteins) caused LQTS: the window into the "cardiac channelopathies" was now open. 16 Currently, there are 12 known LQTS susceptibility genes, 17, 18 although the QTc phenotype can vary and mutations in several genes have been observed in only a few families. Of the 12 genes, mutations in those predisposing to LQT1 (potassium channel gene, KCNQ1), LQT2 (potassium channel gene, KCNH2), and LQT3 (sodium channel gene, SCN5A) account for some 70% of congenital LQTS. 17 
Intellectual property and LQTS testing: dramatis personae
The following list (presented alphabetically) is intended to provide capsule descriptions of many of the important stake- 24 Despite repeated requests, the University of Utah Technology Commercialization Office declined to speak with us while the case study was being prepared. It did consent to an interview in March 2009, but volunteered no materially relevant details about patents or licenses (for this study or for the BRCA case study, in which it is also involved).
Why is genetic testing for LQTS important?
Genetic testing for LQTS is clinically important for several reasons:
• For unequivocal diagnosis of LQTS, it remains the gold standard (W. Chung, personal communication, 2008), 36, 37 although the resting ECG is critical and a negative genetic test cannot rule out the presence of the disease. 1,38
• The consequences of relying solely on clinical history and sometimes imprecise and difficult-to-interpret ECG measurements for diagnosis can be grave. Twenty-five to 50% of genetically proven LQTS patients do not exhibit a pathologically prolonged QTc. 39 If not treated, LQTSmutation carriers not identified by ECG/clinical evaluation have a 10% risk of a serious cardiac event by the age of 40 years. 40 Conversely, a recent study suggests that LQTS may be overdiagnosed; among a cohort of 176 patients referred to the Mayo Clinic for LQTS, 40% left the clinic without such a diagnosis. 41 Such patients who do not truly have LQTS may be given unnecessary beta-blockers or, worse, implanted with gratuitous ICDs.
• Management of LQTS can be genotype dependent. 1, 42, 43 LQT1 mutation carriers are more likely to experience syncope or sudden death in response to emotional or physical stress. 44 For LQT2 patients, cardiac events can be triggered by sudden loud noises. 45 Women with LQT2 mutations are at higher risk for cardiac events during the postpartum period. 46 Thus, genotype-specific management of the environment can be critical. Mutation location within a gene can be an important correlate of severity. 47 Moreover, beta-blocker therapy appears to be more effective in LQT1 patients 48 and may be counterproductive in LQT3, in which the lower heart rate is associated with an increased risk of arrhythmias (W. Chung, personal communication, 2008). In LQT3, the trigger often occurs during rest, whereas both LQT3 and JLNS are more often associated with fatal outcomes. 49 Despite these arguments in favor of genetic testing, our understanding of LQTS remains incomplete. First, it must be emphasized again that a negative genetic test does not rule out a LQTS diagnosis. Second, because it is not always clear that a given variant in a LQTS gene causes disease, the potential for false positive diagnoses remains. 41 Finally, within a family, the same mutation may be associated with radically different severity and type of symptoms. 50 At the moment, genetic testing for LQTS appears to be most useful: (1) when a clinical diagnosis is fairly certain and treatment strategies may depend on the nature of the mutation or (2) to confirm or rule out the diagnosis in family members of an affected proband with a known mutation. 2 The major European and American cardiology societies have issued joint guidelines for the care of patients at risk for sudden cardiac death, including those with LQTS. 51 Genetic testing is recommended for diagnosed LQTS patients. The Sudden Arrhythmia Death Syndromes Foundation (SADS) suggests genetic testing for:
• All patients with a diagnosis of LQTS who have not had a genetic test; • Anyone tested in a research study with family members yet to be tested; or • Family members of a LQTS patient known to carry a mutation. 52 (Clinical Data has supported SADS financially since the company acquired rights to the major LQTS susceptibility genes in 2005. According to its annual reports available online, SADS received funding from Genaissance Pharmaceuticals, the previous exclusive licensee of the major LQTS gene patents, before 2005. 53 )
Finally, we note additional incentives for genetic testing. Both cardiologists and makers of ICDs may financially benefit from the implantation of defibrillators in actual or suspected LQTS patients. Data indicate that ICDs are a cost-effective means of preventing sudden cardiac death when clinically indicated. 10 The dollars involved in ICD procedures dwarf those associated with genetic testing. Final ICD costs in 2007 sometimes approached $40,000. 54 
Genetic testing for LQTS: 1995-2004
After the identification of the first LQTS susceptibility genes, academic laboratories began offering genetic testing on a research basis. Clinicians whom we spoke to said that research subjects would often not receive their LQTS genotypes for a year or more (M. Ackerman In 2001, GeneDx began offering commercial genetic testing for LQT1, LQT2, LQT3, LQT5, and LQT6. BU began testing the following year; both the laboratories also offered prenatal testing. As described in Appendix 8, the GeneDx LQTS testing regime was incomplete: it covered about one third of the combined coding regions of the five most important susceptibility genes (B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008 58, 59 At the time, there was a tacit assumption that LQTS would resemble cystic fibrosis with respect to mutation distribution, i.e., one or a few major mutations accounting for most of the disease burden plus a fair number of rarer mutations. 60 This turned out not to be the case; the overwhelming majority of LQTS mutations are "private" and not recurring (J. Towbin, personal communication, 2008). 2, 47 In an e-mail, the Mayo Clinic's Dr. Michael J. Ackerman, LQTS expert clinician, researcher, and consultant to PGxHealth, emphasized that during this period, there were a substantial number of misdetections and a high false negative rate (i.e., people with mutations causing LQTS but missed by genetic testing methods). He contends that BU, for example, marketed its test as equivalent to his own laboratory's researchbased test, despite the former missing more than 30% of the mutations found by the latter. He believes that this confused doctors and patients because they thought the then-commercially available tests were equivalent to the Mayo test (M. Ackerman, personal communication, 2008) . In his view, this period represented the "black hole" era in LQTS genetic diagnostics (M. Ackerman, personal communication, 2008).
Genetic testing for LQTS: 2004 to early 2009
Since The final report is reviewed and signed by a CLIA-licensed (CLIA of 1988, which were designed to improve the quality and expand federal oversight of clinical laboratories in the United States 64 ) Laboratory Director. Results are returned to the physician "usually within 6 weeks." 65 When a Class I or Class II mutation is found, a recommendation for clinical evaluation and genetic testing of first-degree blood relatives is included in the report (Appendices 2 and 3). Examples of a negative report and the accompanying letter sent to doctors are shown in Appendices 4 and 5, respectively. If the clinical interpretation of a reported variant changes, an amended test report is generated and provided to the referring physician when possible (Appendix 1).
The test costs $5400 for the index case and $900 to confirm/ rule out a previously characterized mutation in each additional family member. PGxHealth maintains a customer service group that works with patients' insurance providers to preauthorize services. PGxHealth is quoted an estimate of coverage from the insurance carrier but does not guarantee reimbursement. 66 
LQTS genes: the IP chain of custody
Insofar as we can tell, until fairly recently, the IP attached to the major LQTS susceptibility genes was exclusively licensed by the University of Utah to a succession of corporate genetic testing firms, but at any given time, exclusive rights were held by a single firm. 35 In 2005, Genaissance was acquired by Clinical Data, Inc. 31 Since that time, Clinical Data subsidiary PGxHealth" has overseen rapid growth in commercial testing for LQTS and other channelopathies. In fiscal 2008, sales of PGxHealth tests grew 41% year-over-year to $4.6 million. Judging from a company presentation, 67 the overwhelming source of this growth was FAMILION testing (for LQTS, CPVT, and Brugada syndrome). LQTS notwithstanding, Clinical Data has licensed rights to these other cardiac disorders on a nonexclusive basis. In May 2008, the company launched a test for HCM. During the same year, the company launched a provider-focused sales force and customer-service staff to help drive FAMILION test adoption, 68 to which much of the sales growth can be attributed, along with an increased focus by PGxHealth in working with physicians to convince reluctant insurers to cover genetic testing for LQTS. PGxHealth reported that it has also invested in enhancements in its laboratory operations to handle the increased volume and to reduce turnaround times (C. Reed and B. 
Genetic testing for LQTS: at issue
Questions about LQTS IP came to the fore and achieved policy significance through the 2007 Congressional testimony of BRLI CEO Dr. Marc Grodman and Columbia University clinical geneticist Dr. Wendy Chung. 20, 22 In their testimony they contended that:
• Competition in diagnostic testing is critical to the public health; because of exclusive licensing of the relevant gene patents in LQTS, there is effectively no competition, and there has not been since 2002.
• The discovery of the LQTS genes was partly funded by National Institutes of Health, yet, the University of Utah had originally, and at the time of Dr. Grodman's testimony, only seen fit to license the patents to a single private-sector provider.
• By sending cease-and-desist letters to and/or suing the laboratories who were offering LQTS genetic testing before commercialization and refusing to sublicense to any other genetic test provider, DNA Sciences, Inc. (the exclusive patent licensee at the time), created a nearly 2-year period during which only research laboratory-based testing was available to LQTS patients and family members. During that period, DNA Sciences "cleared the market" of potential competitors, including nonprofit testing services, although DNA Sciences did not yet offer a test itself.
• LQTS genetic research has been stifled by Clinical Data's monopoly.
• There have been problems with quality and interpretation of results in Clinical Data's LQTS testing.
• Clinical Data has not developed the ability to reliably perform genetic testing on paraffin-embedded samples from deceased persons.
• Clinical Data's testing regime is incomplete.
• Clinical Data's turnaround time can be as long as 6 -8 weeks.
• Variants of unknown significance are disproportionately reported in minority populations.
• FAMILION testing is $5400; a competitive laboratory could offer the test for about "a quarter of the price." The cost of the test is "not routinely covered by most insurance companies without a lengthy preauthorization process that frequently takes 3-12 months to complete." The test would be accessible to many more patients if it were "correctly" priced in a competitive marketplace.
In an April-2008 letter to Howard L. Berman (D-CA), Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Clinical Data CEO Drew Fromkin responded to the Grodman/Chung testimony. 23 In his letter, Fromkin argued:
• The patent system and the availability of exclusive licensing spurs innovation and provides incentives for product development that can save lives. LQTS is a great example.
• Clinical Data is highly motivated to continually improve FAMILION testing: the company has reduced turnaround time from 6 weeks to 4.5 weeks. With or without competition, poor products stop selling.
• Clinical Data periodically considers adding LQTS mutations to its testing regime. Recently, the susceptibility gene for CPVT was added to the FAMILION menu.
• In most cases so far, the inclusion of additional genes would add cost to the test with only minimal clinical benefit.
• Research has not been stifled: since the launch of FAMILION testing, four new LQTS genes have been identified. In the event of a FAMILION test comes back negative, the patient is referred to a research laboratory for further testing.
• Clinical Data are ready to accommodate any common specimen type, including paraffin-embedded tissues.
• Clinical Data holds itself to the highest federal and corporate standards for the quality of its laboratory work: two clear sequencing reads are required for every sample. All variants are reviewed by three people, including a boardcertified medical geneticist.
• Clinical Data responds immediately to reports of inconsistent or erroneous reports.
• Clinical Data regularly presents its LQTS data at national meetings. Additional publications are in preparation.
• Without exclusive patent rights in this and most other fields, competitive pressures would severely limit the disclosure of scientific discovery and harm the public interest.
• Of Ͼ1300 non-LQTS individuals tested, mutation information has been published on Ͼ700 with more to come. This testing is done to quantify and specify background variation, so that the test specificity is understood and so that fewer rare, benign variants are mistaken for pathogenic mutations (C. Reed and B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008).
• Half of the healthy subjects who have been tested have come from non-Caucasian populations.
• Health plan coverage of FAMILION LQTS testing has grown rapidly despite the fact that gaining insurance coverage is "a long and difficult road" that takes years.
• Exclusive licenses lead to higher quality genetic tests that in turn lead to better patient outcomes and a more costeffective health care system. Nonexclusive rights lead to "commodity" and "me-too" tests that place pressures on profit margins, which result in mediocrity and can ultimately harm patients and society. Given such highly polarized and seemingly contradictory assertions, LQTS is a natural case study for the effects of IP on access to genetic testing. Beyond the Grodman/Chung testimony and the Fromkin response, there are other reasons to undertake an examination of patenting in LQTS. First, with an incidence of 1 in 3000 to 1 in 5000, 1, 2, 17 it is a relatively common Mendelian disorder. Second, as in hereditary breast cancer testing, from the outset, there has been a single exclusive licensee of the major LQTS genes (at least until recently). However, there was a period before 2003 when the LQTS gene patent rights were not enforced; thus, we are able to compare the pre-and postenforcement landscapes, albeit in a highly limited way and with some very serious caveats. (BRLI's Dr. Grodman believes that because of advances in technology since the early 2000s, this "then-and-now" comparison unfairly favor current applications. For their part, Clinical Data's Drs. Reed and Salisbury believe that the recent advances in genetic diagnostic technology, the relative completeness of the current commercial test, and the greater awareness of clinicians and patients of genetic testing also cast serious doubt on the validity of this comparison.) Third, genetic testing in LQTS matters: undiagnosed cases may be at high risk for cardiac events, 37, 40 which could potentially be avoided if these individuals were known to carry a mutation in one or more specific genes. Moreover, different mutations in different genes may suggest different therapeutic options. 42, 69, 70 LQTS GENES AND IP
Research, databases, publications, and technical issues
The field of LQTS genetics is still young. As with hereditary breast cancer, the molecular basis of the major LQTS genes has only been known since the mid-1990s. [12] [13] [14] [15] 71 The prospect of a Bayh-Dole act inspired patent incentive, 29, 30 however, did not appear to stimulate a LQTS gene race akin to the race for the hereditary breast cancer genes, 72 probably because of the relative rarity of LQTS and what was presumed to be a small market for LQTS testing. The principal inventor on the LQTS gene patents, Dr. Mark Keating, a cardiologist then at the University of Utah, was himself skeptical about the commercial value of testing, although his laboratory was inundated with requests from other physicians to perform genetic tests on their LQTS patients. Dr. Hugh Rienhoff, the founder of DNA Sciences and a friend of Dr. Keating's, thought there would be commercial value beyond diagnosing LQTS mutations, namely, that SIDS might also be a part of the spectrum of LQTS and that variants in certain genes combined with particular drugs might induce LQTS. Consequently, DNA Sciences licensed the patents on LQTS genes and mutations with a view toward extending the research to include these new patients: SIDS victims and their families and individuals on drug regimens vulnerable to drug-induced LQTS resulting from certain genetic variants. The research into LQTS, thus, stemmed from Dr. Keating's very successful genetics research. DNA Sciences extended the LQTS paradigm into areas that Dr. Keating thought were likely to be more complicated and scientifically less productive. According to Dr. Rienhoff, Keating was "more or less right about that" (H. Rienhoff, personal communication, 2008). 5 Dr. Rienhoff said there was also skepticism on the part of DNA Sciences investors as to whether genetic testing for "infrequent" (in commercial terms) congenital cardiac disorders would be a viable business (H. Rienhoff, personal communication, 2008).
Through 2008, there was no corporate equivalent in LQTS to the extensive Myriad Genetics contributions to the public BRCA mutation database. 73 Dr. Silvia Priori maintains a public, online database in Italy that includes "a couple thousand" LQTS patients; its mutation data are culled mainly from the published literature (S. Priori, personal communication, 2008 74 To the best of our knowledge, during the FAMILION (Genaissance/Clinical Data) testing period from 2004 -2008, there were three full-length LQTS articles published in which scientists employed by the corporate patent licensees shared authorship. [75] [76] [77] The companies also presented data at national meetings and published their findings in abstract form. 61,62,78 -89 PGxHealth representatives informed us in June 2008 that the company had multiple manuscripts in progress (C. Reed, B. Salisbury, and M. Ackerman, personal communication, 2008). As noted in the update at the end of this report, those were published in 2009.
As noted in the Dramatis Personae section, Dr. Ackerman's group performs LQTS genetic research at the Mayo Clinic, as does Dr. Priori's in Pavia, Dr. Moss's in Rochester, Dr. Towbin's at Baylor, Dr. Roden's at Vanderbilt, and Dr. Chung's at Columbia University, among several others. It is clearly not in PGxHealth's interest to discourage or antagonize these investigators-the LQTS research community is fairly small, and these physicians are invaluable liaisons to patients. There has been productive collaboration between PGxHealth and these investigators, including in the interpretation of variants of unknown significance that may or may not cause disease. Dr. Ackerman is a paid consultant to Clinical Data, Dr. Chung is a paid consultant to diagnostic firms BRLI, and Dr. Moss has consulted for Genaissance in the past. In a few cases, however, test results and/or their interpretation appear to have differed (W. Chung and A. Moss, personal communication, 2008) . 22 This is not surprising: virtually all laboratories make occasional errors, 90 even in cases where they are screening for the same few mutations over and over again. 91 However, in instances where discrepancies occur, it is conceivable, especially in a disease as challenging to understand as LQTS that the availability of a second commercial provider held to the same CLIA standards, motivated by the same incentives, and subjected to the same competitive pressures could offer a second source of variant confirmation (and perhaps alternative interpretation). Clinical Data's Dr. Reed: "We encourage our customers to inform us if there is any question or concern regarding a result or an interpretation. We fully annotate our reports and will work to resolve any concerns. If a mistake on our part is found, we will rectify it and improve any process that might have been faulty. In fact, if we are notified of a discrepancy we are obligated to resolve it" (C. Reed and B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008).
"Reinterpreting a result would not require a second laboratory, just an expert, and/or new information. Research laboratories are generally headed by exactly the expert individual capable of sorting out discrepancies and/or differences in interpretation" (C. Reed and B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008) .
It is important to note again the existence of conflicts of interest on all sides. Those providing commercial testing (PGxHealth and its consultants) had an interest in maintaining the status quo. Many of those who would like to see other commercial providers and stand to benefit from becoming one of them (former providers, BRLI and its consultants) had an obvious interest in altering the current system.
The most important LQTS patents licensed to PGxHealth begin to expire in March 2015. 92 Until then, PGxHealth and recent licensee BRLI may exercise significant influence over the course of LQTS genetic research in the United States.
Clinical Data suggested to us that FAMILION testing might actually be facilitating research by identifying patients with known mutations, allowing research laboratories to focus their resources on those without known mutations. The company also emphasized that it does not prevent research laboratories from conducting research (C. Reed and B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008).
To date, although we cannot know with certainty what might have been had there been multiple providers, we have no evidence that the virtual LQTS monopoly from 2003-2008 had a stifling effect on research, with the possible exception of interpretation of variants of unknown significance, which is discussed in subsequent sections.
Development and commercialization
The University of Utah Research Foundation was granted three patents covering the major genes predisposing to LQT1, 95 In the first quarter of 2004, Genaissance concluded agreements with the University of Utah and Yale University covering an estate of more than 50 issued and pending patents relating to the five known mutant genes predisposing to cardiac channelopathies. 19 These agreements included an exclusive license to patents pertaining to the three major LQTS susceptibility genes that had been licensed to DNA Sciences (R. Judson, personal communication, 2008) . The LQTS patent landscape as we understand it is presented in Appendix 6.
The LQTS gene patents were key assets of both DNA Sciences 32 35 came 9 years after the first patent application was filed. 92 We speculate the delay was likely because of a combination of factors: the bursting of the biotech bubble in 2000 (H. Rienhoff, personal communication, 2008), the relative complexity and technical difficulty of the test, 77 and perhaps exclusive IP (which may have created less external competitive pressure on the licensee to launch, although it is possible that exclusivity increased investment up front, expediting product launch).
Genaissance ( The price for complete sequence-based FAMILION testing of five LQTS genes has remained $5400 since the 2004 Genaissance launch (C. Reed and B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008). Payer coverage has increased significantly during these 5 years. 74 Clinical Data's Dr. Reed says that it is important to note that ". . . retail price does not directly correlate with revenue generated and cash received by a laboratory provider, including PGxHealth. Discounting to payers and inability to collect copayments/deductibles from patients leads to a notably lower value to the laboratory" (C. Reed and B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008).
In 2002, GeneDx offered partial testing for $2200. GeneDx claimed that it could detect 87% of the mutations present in the genes for LQT1, LQT2, LQT3, LQT5, and LQT6 and that the overall sensitivity of its test was 59% (see Appendix 8) . Given what has been learned about LQTS mutations since-namely that most mutations are "private" and not recurring 2,47 -GeneDx's sensitivity was probably significantly lower than that estimate. By our calculations, GeneDx was screening about 33% of the five genes' ϳ13.4 kb of combined coding sequence The fairness of the price of five-gene testing ($5400 or ϳ$74 per amplicon) is difficult to judge definitively given the exclusive license (and, therefore, no direct competitive comparison). It is worth noting that in 2002, if we assume one amplicon per exon, GeneDx charged ϳ$129 per amplicon ($2200) for its partial primary screen of 17 exons selected from the five genes. (In patients and families known to have JLNS, a rare autosomal recessive variant of LQTS that features profound congenital deafness, GeneDx screened for mutations in all exons of KCNQ1 and KCNE1, the two susceptibility genes known to cause JLNS [see Appendix 8] ). On the other hand, Myriad Genetics charges $38 per amplicon for its sequence-based testing of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, for which it has exclusive rights (see BRCA case study in this volume) and a significantly higher test volume. In the course of preparing this case study, some patients, patient advocates, and physicians complained to us about the high cost of the FAMILION test and less than complete payer coverage, although incomplete coverage is not in Clinical Data's interest, either. Dr. Rienhoff and Mr. Lehrer, both formerly of DNA Sciences, emphasized the complexity of the test that eventually became FAMILION and said the price should be judged accordingly (S. Lehrer and H. Rienhoff, personal communication, 2008).
In his rebuttal to the Grodman/Chung testimony, Clinical Data CEO Drew Fromkin pointed out that Grodman's firm had recently secured an exclusive license on KCNJ2, the susceptibility gene for hereditary LQTS7, a rare form of the disease, 23 thereby suggesting that Grodman was being hypocritical. Grodman told us that his licensing of the gene was strategic. This case is, thus, a stark illustration of two features of how exclusive licensing of patent rights can influence diagnostic testing-the potential for mutual blocking situations-and the "penumbra effect" (discussed in the hearing loss case study also) in which exclusive rights to one or a few common genetic variants can in effect drive business for all genetic testingeven for variations that have been discovered but not patented or that have never been discovered before-to the rights holder. That is, rights on one set of mutations can be leveraged to drive business for other mutations not covered by patent claims. This has been the practice until very recently for LQTS testing.
In at least one instance, Clinical Data has sublicensed its LQTS IP. In October 2007, the company announced that its PGxHealth subsidiary had entered into a nonexclusive sublicense agreement with the Victorian Clinical Genetics Services, a not-for-profit subsidiary of the Murdoch Children's Research Institute, for the provision of genetic testing for familial LQTS in Australia and New Zealand. 105 According to Dr. Reed, this shows Clinical Data's ". . . willingness to cede markets to others where we are not equipped to provide services" (C. Reed and B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008). However, this has minimal relevance to the US market, because it affects testing in a foreign jurisdiction covered by patent law in that jurisdiction.
PGxHealth has also availed itself of others' nonexclusive licenses. In May 2008, the company launched genetic testing for HCM, which has been licensed by Harvard Medical School to multiple diagnostic providers. 106 Drs. Grodman and Chung contend that HCM is a better model for IP related to genetic testing because it fosters a system of competition and checks and balances 
Communication and marketing
In 2004 -2005, Dr. Ackerman wrote at least four articles in professional journals that noted the availability of commercial genetic testing for LQTS; his financial interest was disclosed in each case. 6, 38, 43, 108 A 2005 article partially funded by Genaissance concluded that genetic testing for familial LQTS was cost-effective. 109 Clinical Data has undertaken efforts to market its services to physicians. In 2007, the company established a sales force to promote FAMILION testing. This sales force makes calls on pediatric electrophysiologists and cardiologists and, increasingly, their adult equivalents. Based on the initial positive results of this effort, the company expanded the size of the sales force in 2008. Clinical Data has also added resources to focus on the provider and payer markets and has a dedicated customer service group (C. Reed and B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008). 68 PGxHealth also markets FAMILION testing via patient advocacy groups and professional organizations that offer patient support and promote research and education. These include the SADS, and "The National Society of Clinical Geneticists." 68 (The authors found no group named the "National Society of Clinical Geneticists." It's possible that this could be referring to the National Society of Genetic Counselors or the American College of Medical Genetics.)
Examining test quality
In five cases, Dr. Chung, a paid consultant to BRLI and former consultant to PGxHealth, said she split samples and tried to confirm PGxHealth's results in her own laboratory. In two cases, she said there were discrepancies. In one case, there was a sequencing problem; in the other, there was an informatics issue (W. Dr. Chung believes that having only a single commercial provider denies clinicians the opportunity to solicit a second opinion. ". . . when you don't have the ability to get a second opinion, you have no idea where your errors or pitfalls are and [there is] no independent way for clinicians to be able to validate whatever they're seeing or, on the other hand, to be able to come up with [what] at the end is a correct diagnosis" (W. Chung, personal communication, 2008) . Dr. Milunsky, who is a past and would-be a provider of commercial testing, shares this view (A. Milunsky, personal communication, 2008) . Their assumption is that multiple providers would reach consensus interpretations, and alternative providers would be accompanied by more public availability of data and more open to discussion of its interpretation. In her 2007 testimony, Dr. Chung stated that PGxHealth is not able to reliably offer genetic testing on paraffin-embedded tissue samples, which is often the only tissue sample available from deceased persons. 22 She told us about a case in which a patient was receiving a heart transplant in which the donor heart had LQTS; she described an "ordeal" to get PGxHealth to extract DNA from frozen tissue. 22 By its own admission, PGxHealth's results have not been perfect. In biannual proficiency testing, "there has been an occasional conflict," although Dr. Reed emphasizes that in every such case, "we have been right" (C. Reed and B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008).
Responses to quality concerns
Dr. Reed takes strong exception to Dr. Chung's claims: ". . . Dr. Chung [is] a paid consultant to a competitor company that desires access to the patents under discussion." "These variants are inherently ambiguous and 'problematic.' This has nothing to do with 'protocols,' rather it is a matter of biomedical science where even experts may disagree. Just because we don't interpret every mutation the way Dr. Chung might, does not make it wrong. We acknowledge that this is a difficult area. Thus, Dr. Chung's concerns are no surprise and are indicative of the state of the art." Dr. Reed also notes that as a former member of a FAMILION Advisory Board, Dr. Chung has engaged herself in discussions with the company as to the difficulty in interpreting these variants. Dr. Reed also points out PGxHealth uses a reference population of Ͼ1300 controls to evaluate all variants (Appendix 1). This reference population, says Dr. Reed, plays a critical role in ensuring that variants are appropriately classified. Finally, with respect to including additional genes, Dr. Reed suggests that the lack of knowledge about these loci makes it ". . . premature to include these genes in a clinical test . . . [A]dding them could create more confusion for cardiologists and may decrease the clinical specificity of testing." Furthermore, she notes that Dr. Moss, as quoted in this report (see below), does not think it worthwhile to add genes with noncardiac syndromic manifestations that can be fairly easily diagnosed by physical examination (C. Reed and B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008) . Again, we note that PGxHealth has since added six genes to its test panel.
For proficiency testing of the FAMILION assay, Dr. Ackerman sends blinded, de-identified samples to PGxHealth every 6 months. According to him, since 2004, there has been only a single discordant result, which was attributable to his laboratory missing a nonsynonymous variant that PGxHealth detected (M. Again, one difficulty in evaluating the quality and proficiency FAMILION testing is the inherent conflict of interest of a number of the critical stakeholders. Dr. Ackerman, for example, is a paid consultant to Clinical Data. Dr. Chung is a paid consultant to Clinical Data competitor BRLI and former consultant to PGxHealth. Mr. Fromkin and Dr. Grodman are at the helms of the two competing companies.
Five current and former LQTS genetic researchers/clinicians we spoke to do not have any current and direct financial conflicts of interest related to genetic testing for variants in the five major genes predisposing to congenital LQTS. We asked them specifically to disclose any financial arrangements linked to LQTS patents and licensees. These experts offered their perspectives on the perceived quality of and/or rationale behind FAMILION testing for LQTS mutations circa 2008:
• Dr. Silvia Priori: "[M]y interpretation of the situation [is] that the company [PGxHealth] is definitely better than any research laboratory. It has to be better than any research laboratory in handling the samples and quickly performing the sequence analysis. Obviously the difference comes in the interpretation of the mutation . . . a research laboratory has a lot of time dedicated to studying the individual mutation. "This is a problem that is widespread and not specific to the particular parties at hand. New missense mutations will always pose a problem for interpretation. It is a challenge to show that any new variant in a gene has functional consequences [for] either mRNA stability or protein structure and function. It is unrealistic to think anyone could easily resolve the un-interpretability of these findings. Indeed, it simply underscores the fact that we are still early in our description of the human genome and the variants that can be found in it." (H. Rienhoff, personal communication, 2008) .
In addition to the difficulty of finding experts who do not have a current or past conflict of interest, another impediment to making objective assessments regarding quality is the present inadequacy of CLIA oversight of genetic testing laboratories. 110, 111 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services have yet to institute specific requirements for molecular or biochemical genetic testing laboratories. Thus, although CLIA requires laboratories to have quality assurance programs in place, most genetic testing laboratories are not required by CLIA to perform proficiency testing with specific benchmarks. 111 Moreover, petitions to Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to issue updated standards for genetic testing laboratories, including standards for proficiency testing, have thus far gone unheeded. 112 To its credit, PGxHealth has instituted its own proficiency testing program in conjunction with Dr. Ackerman (M. Ackerman and C. Reed, personal communication, 2008). However, when such proficiency testing is in place, there is no CLIA guidance about whether the conduct of such testing under auspices of a paid consultant is an acceptable practice. Clinical Data has opposed more stringent regulation of laboratory-developed tests such as FAMILION. 113 Allelic dropout is another issue that pertains to test quality. Allelic dropout is a technical problem in DNA amplification, 114 which likely contributed to the relatively low yield of LQTS mutations in the pre-Genaissance/PGxHealth era. A year after commercial launch, at a national meeting, the company presented its experiences with discovery and avoidance of the allelic dropout problems present in assays used by research laboratories. 86 In late 2005, scientists from the Mayo Clinic and what was then still Genaissance submitted an article on the allelic dropout phenomenon to a peer reviewed journal, which appeared in 2006. 77 The recognition of allelic dropout ultimately improved the sensitivity of the test.
As for sample type, PGxHealth Chief Medical Officer Dr. Carol Reed told us via e-mail that, "Our laboratory does and has always accepted paraffin-embedded tissue for testing, so long as it meets quality specifications" (C. Reed, personal communication, 2008). Obtaining DNA from paraffin-embedded tissue can be challenging, however, because the DNA tends to be degraded. According to a recent article from Dr. Ackerman's group, for example, DNA from such tissue should be considered "error prone and unreliable in comprehensive surveillance of sudden unexplained death-associated genes". 115 (p. 391) However, some relatively successful protocols appear to exist, particularly for subsequent amplification of shorter DNA fragments, 116 -119 although this may not be practical for all exons in LQTS susceptibility genes (C. Reed and B. Salisbury, personal communication, 2008) . Nevertheless, as Dr. Ackerman's group has recommended, given the shortcomings associated with DNA extraction from paraffin-embedded tissue, standard autopsy procedures for sudden unexplained death should include archiving preserved blood or frozen tissue to facilitate postmortem genetic testing. 115 
Adoption by clinical providers
We suspect that relatively few LQTS genetic tests 104 In 2006 clinical guidelines published by the American College of Cardiology, the American Heart Association, and the European Society of Cardiology, 51 genetic testing for LQTS was deemed "very important" for identifying all affected members within a family. In patients affected by LQTS, genetic analysis was considered "useful for risk stratification and for making therapeutic decisions." In an interview with us, Dr. Towbin thought the 2006 guidelines were somewhat inadequate given how new and poorly understood genetic testing was when those guidelines were written; he noted that the Heart Rhythm Society is preparing new guidelines (J. Towbin, personal communication, 2008).
There is ample room for further growth in genetic testing for LQTS. In a January 2007 presentation to investors made by Clinical Data, 120 the company estimated there to be a $94.5-million market for initial LQTS genetic screening ($81 million) and subsequent mutation screening within families ($13.5 million).
Consumer utilization
We can only speculate about whether the patent enforcement actions of the early 2000s adversely affected consumer access to commercial genetic testing for LQTS. The overall number of LQTS patients affected by the patent enforcement actions was probably small. According to Dr. Towbin, there was minimal awareness of genetic testing and poor understanding of LQTS genetics at the time. "In 2002, nobody took DNA Sciences or anyone else seriously as purveyors of a LQTS diagnostic test, in part because they themselves didn't. They weren't advertising, they didn't have buy-in, and [they] were talking about testing for specific mutations, which didn't make sense" (J. Towbin, personal communication, 2008 [121] [122] [123] [124] Our own informal collation of consumer views of LQTS testing culled from the online C.A.R.E. Cardiac Arrhythmias Support Community (http://www.inspire.com/groups/carecardiac-arrhythmias/) suggests that LQTS patients want information about their condition, including genetic information. Many are understandably frightened by the prospect of sudden cardiac death and are concerned about potential triggers for such events. As far as we can tell, out-of-pocket cost is the most significant deterrent to consumer utilization, although several patients complained about the turnaround time and the time necessary to negotiate insurance coverage. A summary of our very preliminary findings from the C.A.R.E. forum appears below. It is important to note the caveats: all data are selfreported, and the sample size is minimal. This is a convenience sample of motivated forum participants, not a representative sample of the general population. We take up the payment issue in the next section on adoption by third-party payers. Tables  1-6 provide the C.A.R.E. LQTS genetic testing data.
The lone study that modeled the cost-effectiveness of genetic testing for LQTS concluded that it is indeed cost-effective when compared with no testing. 109 It should be noted that, however, some funding for this 2005 study was provided by Genaissance through independent consulting contracts to two coauthors, Drs. Phillips and Ackerman. 109 The clinicians and researchers we interviewed all said they try to make testing available to those who cannot afford it. Dr. Ackerman described a "gentleman's agreement" with PGxHealth whereby if an insurer denies payment, he will offer a charity waiver (M. Ackerman, personal communication, 2008 
SUMMING UP
Genetic testing for LQTS is a complex story that illustrates several features relevant to clinical access to genetic testing in general. Some of the complexity is biological: the clinical syndrome is uncommon but not rare. The mutations causing it are found in a multitude of genes. Sequencing the five genes most commonly mutated accounts for an estimated 75% of cases, but beyond those, there are many variants that truly are rare. The IP overlay of this biological story is also complex. It started with aggregation of the three initial patents by a single firm that "cleared the market" of testing services offering partial LQTS testing, but went bankrupt before it offered a test itself. Its rights were acquired by a second firm that introduced FAMILION, which was in turn sold to Clinical Data, Inc., which continues to offer it through its subsidiary, PGxHealth. This was the main provider of testing in the United States through 2009, although some research laboratories did and do offer testing for indigent patients, for those with rare variants not found by commercial testing, and perhaps in other circumstances.
BRLI has quietly accumulated some exclusive patent rights of its own and has used them strategically to change the market dynamics of LQTS testing. This case shows both how exclusive licensing can enable a single provider to "own" genetic testing for an entire clinical syndrome by holding rights to the most common patented variants and leveraging those rights to cover unpatented variants and variants never before discovered. However, it also illustrates the vulnerability of this strategy to a competitor that acquires countervailing exclusive rights. That was the situation that was unfolding for LQTS testing as this case study was being prepared.
The case also illustrates the fact that coverage decisions by insurers and health plans, and the level of reimbursement payments are arguably larger and more pervasive problems for clinical access to genetic testing than patent status. On the other hand, exclusive patent rights also seem to have contributed to relatively high pricing for LQTS testing.
In some ways, this case is simpler than others that could follow. Most of the key patents were licensed by a single institution, the University of Utah, which has now exclusively licensed rights to different mutations to two different firms. If there were multiple patent holders, then even more parties, with potentially different stakes, would be involved in the negotiations.
The case illustrates how complex and pervasive the financial connections are. The community of clinical experts is fairly small, and its members respect one another's clinical expertise. They disagree about best practices, particularly regarding exclusive licensing of university-based patents involved in genetic testing, and their positions do map to their financial arrangements (although causality could be in both directions-those most trusting of a company's practices are apt to consult for it). Those without financial ties acknowledge the value of commercial testing but also worry about high prices limiting access and the importance of having alternative sources because even highquality laboratories make mistakes, and the system needs to have checks and balances. We find no consensus among the clinical experts most familiar with the medical consequences of testing, dominated until very recently by a single-provider commercial model, whether the single-provider model is a net social benefit or a problem.
Finally, the case study shows the technological instability of current protocols for genetic testing. If full-genome sequencing becomes feasible in the next few years, and if its price comes into the same range as the $5400 FAMILION test, as seems likely, then the IP consequences will become even more complex. The question of patent infringement will turn on the precise language of relevant patents, how courts interpret those claims, and the business decisions of patent holders with claims on DNA sequences and their clinical interpretation. The choice of total genomic sequencing could be either an alternative to testing for a particular syndrome or full-genome sequencing could become the first step in a clinical decision tree that reduces the role of boutique genetic testing to confirming mutations provisionally detected. This would be a profound perturbation of the current business models. Moreover, genome sequencing will almost certainly lead to a dramatic increase in the number of reported variants in cardiac ion-channel genes that are deemed to be "of unknown significance." This is likely to exacerbate existing problems of variant interpretation by orders of magnitude.
The future promises to add further layers of uncertainty regarding both IP and technological options for genetic testing.
LQTS Case Study Update: November 2009
• In 2008, BRLI obtained exclusive licensing rights from the University of Utah that gave it rights to test for LQT3, which accounts for ϳ10 -15% of inherited LQTS. BRLI also aggregated IP related to susceptibility genes for LQT1, LQT2, LQT5, LQT6, LQT7, and JLNS. As a consequence, the patent landscape for LQTS testing became fragmented between two different exclusive licensees.
• In early 2009, BRLI, via its GeneDx subsidiary, entered the LQTS testing market. 128 It now competes with the previous licensee, Clinical Data, Inc., subsidiary PGxHealth. As of November 2009, GeneDx tested for 10 LQTS susceptibility genes (LQT1 through LQT10), 129 whereas PGxHealth tested for 11 susceptibility genes (LQT1 through LQT3; LQT5 through LQT12). 130 • In fall 2009, PGxHealth scientists and Mayo Clinic investigators published two articles describing variants in large numbers of LQTS patients and family members. In one article, the authors conducted a retrospective analysis of the first 2500 cases to undergo the five-gene version of FA-MILION testing. This publication increased the publicly available compendium of LQTS mutations by Ͼ50%. Mutation yield was 36%; 9% of mutation-positive cases were compound heterozygotes; and one third of newly detected mutations were found to be novel. 133 In the second article, the investigators compared type, frequency, and location of mutations among 388 clinically confirmed LQTS cases and Ͼ1300 controls. Variant type, location, and patient ethnicity were each found to play a role in whether a given variant was likely to be pathogenic. 134 • These two studies point up the ongoing difficulty in distinguishing benign variants from pathogenic ones, particularly in the absence of phenotypic data. 135 Darbar 136 has advocated a multifaceted approach: (1) screening large, ethnically matched control populations to establish variant frequencies; (2) examining cosegregation of disease and variants in extended pedigrees; (3) examining whether variants are conserved across species; (4) noting mutation type and location; and (5) carrying out functional studies of suspected pathogenic variants. If cardiologists can pool detailed phenotypic data from suspected cases, our hope is that having two commercial entities offering genetic testing for LQTS to whoever needs it and then sharing their findings will enable the development of more reliable correlations between genotype and risk of sudden cardiac death.
BRLI has obtained licenses to US6274332 and US6420124 from the University of Utah Research Foundation. The patents claim methods for screening drugs that can be used to treat individuals with mutations in KCNE1 and KCNQ1 respectively. BRLI also has licensed US7208273 from the University of Utah, which covers the detection of SCN5A polymorphisms for diagnosing drug-induced ventricular fibrillation. 
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